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on-the-job-search. There is incomplete information about the quality of the 
employee-ﬁ  rm match which provides persistence in employment relationships 
and the rationale for on-the-job search. Ampliﬁ  cation arises because productivity 
changes not only affect ﬁ  rms’ probability of contacting unemployed workers but 
also of contacting already employed workers. Since higher productivity raises 
the value of all matches, even low quality matches become productive enough to 
survive in expansions. Therefore the measure of workers in low quality matches 
is greater when productivity is high, implying a higher probability of switching 
to another match. In other words, ﬁ  rms are more likely to meet employed work-
ers in expansions and those they meet are more likely to accept a ﬁ  rm’s job offer 
because they are more likely to be employed in a low quality match. This intro-
duces strongly procyclical labor market reallocation through procyclical job-to-
job transitions. Simulations with a productivity process that is consistent with 
average labor productivity in the U.S. show that standard deviations for unem-
ployment, vacancies and market tightness (vacancy-unemployment ratio) match 
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In the last two decades, labor market search models have been used extensively to under-
stand aggregate labor market phenomena, such as equilibrium unemployment and vacancies
(Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Pissarides (2000)). This theoretical framework also proved
to be useful in analyzing the e⁄ects of various labor market policies including unemployment
insurance and labor turnover costs. However, search models have recently been criticized for
their business cycle implications. In particular, Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005) argue that
standard models of labor market search require implausibly large shocks to generate substantial
variation in key variables; unemployment, vacancies and market tightness (vacancy to unem-
ployment ratio) 1. Standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are 10 times, market
tightness is 19 times as large as the standard deviation of the average product per worker in the
U.S. A puzzle arises since a standard calibration of Mortensen-Pissarides model implies that
the variations in all these variables is basically the same as productivity.
This paper studies ampli￿cation of productivity shocks in labor markets through on-the-
job-search. Nagypal (2004a) and Shimer (2005b) argue that job-to-job transitions are crucial
for the cyclical worker reallocation. Exploiting dependent interviewing methods introduced
in the CPS in 1994, Fallick and Fleischman (2004) ￿nd that these ￿ ows are large: On average
2.6% of employed workers change employers each month. Moreover, job-to-job transitions turn
out to be signi￿cantly procyclical. This particular ￿ ow cannot be analyzed by standard search
models. Thus, on-the-job search seems to be a natural extension of the standard labor market
search model.
In the model, workers are allowed to search for another job while employed without incur-
ring any cost. There is also symmetric incomplete information about the quality of the match,
which provides persistent employment relationships and a rationale for on-the-job search. Thus,
workers in low quality matches have an incentive to search for and accept better quality matches.
In equilibrium, workers are distributed over di⁄erent match qualities at any point in time. Am-
pli￿cation arises in the model because productivity changes not only a⁄ect ￿rms￿probability of
1Fujita and Ramey (2005) present simulations of the ￿ standard￿Mortensen - Pissarides model that show
much more variability. However, their representation of the Mortensen - Pissarides model deviates from the
standard version in many respects, including a di⁄erent timing assumption and di⁄erent separation rates for new
and prevailing matches.
2contacting unemployed workers but also of contacting already employed workers. For instance,
in expansions, ￿rms are more likely to meet employed workers and those they meet are more
likely to accept ￿rm￿ s job o⁄er because they are more likely to be employed in a low quality
match. This provides the incentive for the ￿rms to post more vacancies than predicted in the
standard model. The logic behind this is simple; since higher productivity raises the value
of all matches, even low quality matches become productive enough to survive in expansions.
Therefore the measure of workers in low quality matches is greater when productivity is high,
implying a higher probability of switching to another match. This introduces strongly procycli-
cal labor market reallocation through procyclical job-to-job transitions. Therefore, the e⁄ects
of productivity shocks on employment distribution play a key role in generating the desired
ampli￿cation.
One other contribution of on-the-job search that helps to create ampli￿cation is the presence
of larger stock of job seekers. In the standard labor market search model, a positive productivity
shock leads to higher number of vacancies and lower unemployment by increasing the job ￿nding
rate. As the productivity shock persists, since all new workers come from the unemployment
pool, ￿rms will expect to ￿nd increasingly less number of unemployed workers to ￿ll in the
available vacancies. This dampens the positive e⁄ect of productivity shock on the supply of
vacancies. With on-the-job search, however, this o⁄setting e⁄ect will not be present. To the
contrary, due to a substantial number of employed workers at low quality matches who are
ready to switch, ￿rms have incentives to post additional vacancies.
The model provides a possible channel for ampli￿cation that does not require changing the
wage determination process or the information structure to a large extent. In particular, simu-
lations show that the standard deviations for all three labor market variables are matched. The
model also successfully predicts that market tightness, de￿ned as the ratio of vacancies to unem-
ployment, is more volatile than both vacancies and unemployment. In addition, the presence of
endogenous separation is reconciled with the negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies over business cycle frequencies.
This paper also has a computational contribution. On-the-job search with match het-
erogeneity implies that the entire employment distribution becomes a state variable for the
recursive problem. It is well known in the literature that this complicates the numerical solu-
3tion of the equilibrium. I utilize the algorithm used by Krusell and Smith (1998) to address
a similar problem. The computational exercise suggests that approximating the worker￿ s ac-
ceptance probability of a ￿rm￿ s job o⁄er su¢ ces to characterize the equilibrium. This enables
me to numerically solve for the stochastic equilibrium of this economy. In contrast, other
studies that modeled on-the-job search either used some simplifying assumptions to get rid
of the endogenous e⁄ects of heterogeneity or simply restricted the analysis to non-stochastic
equilibrium.
The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the U.S. aggregate
labor market data. It shows that the variation in average labor productivity is much less than
the observed variation in vacancies, unemployment and market tightness. This section also
includes some results from a simulation of the standard labor market search model in order to
quantify the size of the "ampli￿cation puzzle". Section 4 describes the economic environment
and lays out the dynamic optimization problem of agents. Section 5 characterizes the equilib-
rium of the economy and describes the computational procedure to handle the presence of the
employment distribution in the state space. Section 6 and Section 7 discuss calibration and
the solution to the computational problem in detail respectively. Section 8 presents the results
from the simulation of the model and discusses the implications of the model.
2 Related Literature
Early studies of labor market search either failed to address the magnitude of the exogenous
forcing process (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Cole and Rogerson (1999)) or implied counter-
factually positive relationship between unemployment and vacancies (Andolfatto (1996), Merz
(1995), Ramey and Watson (1997)).
Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005) claim that the reason for the lack of ampli￿cation in these
models is the underlying wage determination mechanism. In search models, an increase in
labor productivity raises the labor demand, hence the number of vacancies posted by ￿rms.
Since labor markets match vacancies and unemployment as an increasing function of both,
more vacancies increase the job-￿nding probability of workers. Higher job-￿nding probability
reduces unemployment, implying a negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment.
4However, since workers are now hired at a higher pace, unemployment duration also falls in
addition to unemployment. This raises the workers￿threat point in bargaining and leads to
an o⁄setting change in terms of higher wages. Therefore, ￿rms￿incentive to create vacancies
falls (Shimer (2005a), p. 25-26). Hall (2004, 2005), Shimer (2004) and Kennan (2004) build
on this presumption and introduce wage rigidity either exogenously or through an endogenous
mechanism. As I argue in this paper, a modi￿cation to the wage mechanism is not a necessary
condition for ampli￿cation. Indeed, a recent paper by Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) discusses
this point extensively, suggesting that wage rigidity per se is not the answer for ampli￿cation.
For instance, assuming no bargaining strength for workers leads to constant wages that are
equal to the reservation wage ( i.e. the value of leisure). Even in this case, the variability of
labor market variables relative to productivity are an order of magnitude smaller (Mortensen
and Nagypal (2005), p.9).
Several recent studies also aim to provide a mechanism to amplify the e⁄ects of business
cycle shocks on unemployment and vacancies (Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005), Krause and
Lubik (2004), Nagypal (2005) and Silva and Toledo (2005)). Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005)
use an unrealistically high value of leisure to generate ampli￿cation. Silva and Toledo (2005)￿ s
result depends on a combination of right parameter values for separation, hiring and training
costs. Krause and Lubik (2004) and Nagypal (2005) are closer to this paper in that both model
on-the job search. In general on-the-job search introduces the heterogeneity of job seekers
into the picture. Coupled with the aggregate uncertainty, this complicates the problem to a
great extent. This might be the reason why Krause and Lubik (2004) assumes a segregated
market for di⁄erent kind of jobs to simplify the potential complexity of the model, whereas
Nagypal (2005) only restricts the analysis to non-stochastic equilibrium. In contrast, I handle
the heterogeneity that is induced through on-the-job search so that the stochastic equilibrium
of the model could be studied.
3 U.S. Labor Market Facts
This section presents some of the salient features of the U.S. aggregate labor market data over
the business cycle to motivate the questions addressed in the paper. I focus on three key
5labor market variables; unemployment, vacancies and market tightness as de￿ned by the ratio
of vacancies to unemployment. These are standard variables describing the state of the labor
market. Since the mechanism emphasized in this paper also has implications for transitions
between di⁄erent labor market states, I present two series that proxy transition probabilities
between unemployment and employment. These measures are recently constructed by Shimer
(2005a and 2005b).
Unemployment is the quarterly average of seasonally adjusted monthly data constructed
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
Vacancies are proxied by quarterly averages of the seasonally adjusted monthly Help-Wanted
Advertising Index constructed by the Conference Board. The index is normalized to 100 for
1987. Market tightness variable is constructed using these two and equals the ratio of unem-
ployment to vacancies. In order to determine productivity changes over the cycle, I use real
output per person in the non-farm business sector. This particular series is chosen to ensure
comparability with the recent body of literature. It is also a natural way to think about
productivity in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. This series is part of BLS￿ s Major
Sector Productivity and Costs program. It is normalized to 100 for 1992.
Job ￿nding and separation probabilities describe the hazard of changing labor market state.
For instance, job ￿nding probability is the hazard rate for an unemployed worker of ￿nding a
job. Hence, it gives the probability of switching between state of unemployment (u) to state
of employment (e). The opposite of this measure is separation probability (e-u transition).
Shimer uses short term unemployment data and total unemployment data to pin down these
probabilities2. Let Ut be the number of unemployed in month t, Us
t be the number of workers
unemployed less than a month in month t; and Et be the number of workers employed in month
t. Then, job ￿nding and separation probabilities are constructed by the following two formulas
respectively.





2A detailed discussion of how these are constructed is in Shimer (2005a and 2005b). Data is available






The separation probability takes into account the possibility of having a short spell of
employment in a month to get rid of the time aggregation bias. All of the data reported here
are expressed as quarterly averages of monthly data, except the average labor productivity,
which is quarterly. The data covers the post-war period, starting from ￿rst quarter of 1951
and ending by the end of 2003. All variables are expressed in log deviations from an HP ￿lter
with a smoothing parameter 10^5.
First, consider the cyclical variation in unemployment and vacancies relative to the labor
productivity. As Figures ?? and ?? show, both variables show much more variability than
the average labor productivity. Same is true for the cyclical variation of market tightness
(see Figure ??) . The latter two variables show strong procyclicality as opposed to counter-
cyclical unemployment. Figures (??) and (??) complement this picture. It appears from
these two ￿gures that job ￿nding probability is strongly procyclical and separation probabil-
ity is countercyclical. These ￿ndings are summarized in Table 1. The second row denotes
the variables of interest: u for unemployment, v for vacancies, v/u for market tightness, u-e
for job ￿nding probability, e-u for separation probability and z for labor productivity. The
third row in the table states standard deviations of these variables and the fourth row gives
one period auto correlations. Ampli￿cation of productivity shocks is clear from the third row.
Both unemployment and vacancies are 10 times more volatile than labor productivity. Market
tightness is even more volatile, approximately 19 times more. The ampli￿cation puzzle, which
motivates this paper, states that the standard labor market search model cannot generate this
much ampli￿cation based on a productivity process that resembles z in the data. In order
to compare data ￿ndings in Table 1 with the implications of the model, I simulate a standard
Mortensen-Pissarides model. Since, this model is well known in the literature, details of it is
presented in the Appendix (see Pissarides (2000) for an extensive treatment of the model and
its implications).
7Table 1: U.S. DATA (Quarterly, 1951Q1-2003Q4)
u v v/u u-e e-u z
Std 0:19 0:20 0:38 0:12 0:07 0:02
Auto 0:94 0:95 0:95 0:91 0:73 0:89
Cross Correlations
u ￿0:89 ￿0:97 ￿0:95 0:71 ￿0:42
v 0:97 0:90 ￿0:69 0:37
v/u 0:95 ￿0:72 0:40
u-e ￿0:58 0:41
e-u ￿0:52
Table 2 presents simulation results from the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. Pro-
ductivity process is calibrated to match the actual z series in terms of standard deviation and
autocorrelation. In particular, I use a two point Markov process approximated to match the
underlying AR(1) process of z according to Tauchen￿ s method (Tauchen, 1986). As Table 2
clearly indicates, the standard model implies almost the same magnitude of variation in all key
variables. There is virtually no ampli￿cation. Third rows of Table 1 and Table 2 make this
point clear beyond doubt. This discrepancy between the model￿ s implications and the data is
referred to as ampli￿cation puzzle in this paper.
Table 2: MP Model with Constant Separation
u v v/u u-e e-u z
Std 0:01 0:02 0:03 0:01 0 0:02
Auto 0:85 0:74 0:81 0:81 1 0:81
Cross Correlations
u ￿0:87 ￿0:94 ￿0:99 0 ￿0:94
v 0:99 0:92 0 0:99
v/u 1 0 1
u-e 0 1
e-u 0
8One key feature of the data is that separations show a countercyclical variation. This
is clearly evident in Figure ?? and Table 1. The standard model, however, assumes constant
separations. Studies trying to model endogenous separations as a potential channel to introduce
variations in unemployment provides a natural extension to the standard model. However, as
argued in the introduction, endogenous separations usually lead to counterfactually positive
correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
The negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies has long been recognized
by researchers. Indeed, one of the key facts that the standard model was intended to explain
was this negative correlation, which has been traditionally named as the Beveridge Curve. The
U.S. Beveridge Curve is shown in Figure ??. This relationship is also apparent in Table 1 in
the form of a strong negative correlation of ￿0:89.
Shimer (2005a) provides a detailed discussion of why separation shocks alone, or separations
in general fail to generate the Beveridge curve. In order to emphasize this point, results from
the simulation of a standard search model with idiosyncratic match productivity would be
helpful. For this, I will present simulations from an extension of the standard model laid out
in the next section but does not feature on-the-job search.
Table 3: MP Model with Endogenous Separation
u v v/u u-e e-u z
Std 0:09 0:03 0:07 0:06 0:11 0:02
Auto 0:78 0:69 0:81 0:82 0:83 0:81
Cross Correlations
u 0:94 ￿0:99 ￿0:99 0:72 ￿0:99
v ￿0:88 -0:88 0:73 ￿0:88
v/u 0:99 ￿0:69 0:99
u-e ￿0:62 0:99
e-u ￿0:69
Simulations in Table 3 indicate that endogenizing separations imply a positive correlation
between unemployment and vacancies. The correlation turns out to be 0:94 in contrast to the
empirical counterpart of ￿0:89. The model proposed in this paper not only reconciles endoge-
9nous separations with a downward sloping Beveridge curve but also increases the ampli￿cation
lacked in the standard model.
Finally, the U.S. data indicates that most of the variations in unemployment and vacancies
are due to more variable job ￿nding probabilities. The arti￿cial probability series constructed
by using (1) and (2) indicate that, it is the hiring which varies more over the cycle. The
standard deviation of the job ￿nding probability is almost two times greater than that of
separations. Their cyclical variations are presented in Figures ?? and ??. Although on-the-
job search introduced in this paper implies another possible transition, namely e-e transition,
these probabilities are still useful benchmarks to compare.
4 The Economic Environment
The model I present here is an extended version of Pries and Rogerson (2005). They study
implications of di⁄erent labor market institutions on hiring policies and labor market ￿ ows.
Their model incorporates symmetric incomplete information into the standard search model.
Symmetric incomplete information motivates agents to learn about their match quality over
time by observing idiosyncratic component of their output. This mechanism causes persistent
idiosyncratic match speci￿c productivity. Alternatively, one could assume a slightly more
complicated persistent exogenous process that governs idiosyncratic component of matches.
However, as Nagypal (2004b) argues, learning about match quality is the key determinant of
match speci￿c capital especially after ￿rst few months of tenure. Hence, learning about match
quality provides an empirically relevant story about productivity changes over the job. In
addition, I add two key features to this model to explain the ampli￿cation puzzle: On-the-job
search and aggregate uncertainty.
There is a continuum of risk neutral workers and employers who discount the future at the
rate ￿ 2 (0;1). The measure of workers is normalized to 1. Workers and employers come
together in a labor market which is characterized by search frictions.
104.1 Learning and Production Technology
Employers are endowed with a production technology that produces yt 2 Y = fyh;yljyh >
ylg ￿ R++ when matched with a worker. Hence, when a worker and a ￿rm form a productive
match, they produce ztyt; which depends on the inherent match quality and aggregate state,
zt. Aggregate productivity is governed by a Markov process, ￿(zt+1jzt) and is independent of
the idiosyncratic component. Even though both workers and ￿rms observe the match speci￿c
component of the output, yt; and the aggregate state, they do not observe their actual match
quality, q; which can be good or bad. Match speci￿c output is determined by the following
relationship3:
Pr(yt = yhjq = g) = ￿g > Pr(yt = yljq = g) = 1 ￿ ￿g (3)
Pr(yt = yljq = b) = ￿b > Pr(yt = yhjq = b) = 1 ￿ ￿b
Though q is unobservable, agents receive an initial signal ￿0 2 [0;1] that corresponds to
the probability that the match will be good if formed. It is same for both the worker and the
￿rm. This initial signal is received from a truncated normal distribution, i.e ￿0 s ￿(￿;￿)4.
This distribution is time invariant. After the initial period, both parties start learning abouth
their match quality based on output realizations. Since there is no asymmetric information
and the output is observed by both, they will have the same posterior belief about the match
quality. Let Pr(q = gjyt￿1) = ￿ denote this probability that the current match is a good
match conditional on the past output realization on the match, yt￿1. Agents need to infer
Pr(q = gjyt) and Pr(q = bjyt) for yt 2 fyh;ylg. At this point, it may be useful to compute the
posteriors. It follows from simple Bayesian inference.
Pr(q = gjyt = y) =
Pr(q = gjyt￿1)Pr(yt = yjq = g)
Pr(q = gjyt￿1)Pr(yt = yjq = g) + Pr(q = bjyt￿1)Pr(yt = Y ￿ yjq = b)
3This is slightly di⁄erent from Pries and Rogerson (2005) and allows for long term learning. It could be
interpreted as a reduced form learning process that in e⁄ect is governed as in Jovanovic (1979).
4Because ￿ is restricted to be in the unit interval, ￿(￿;￿) represents the cdf of a normal distribution with
parameters ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ which is appropriately reweighted to be well de￿ned. Hence, a pair of parameters of the
actual distribution (^ ￿; ^ ￿) implies a corresponding pair for ￿, (￿;￿).
11After some algebra, I arrive at the following posteriors implied by prior belief, ￿, and time
t output realization.
Pr(q = gjyt = yh) = ￿h =
￿￿g
￿￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿b)
(4)
Pr(q = gjyt = yl) = ￿l =
￿(1 ￿ ￿g)
￿(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b
The posterior is updated to ￿h after observing a high output and to ￿l after low output.
Intuitively, ￿h is expected to be higher than the current state ￿. More formally, the current
state is related to the future state in the following way under (3).
Remark 1 If (3) holds; ￿h(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿l(￿) and both ￿h(￿) and ￿l(￿) are increasing in ￿. In
addition, ￿h(￿) is concave whereas ￿l(￿) is convex5.
This remark summarizes the information revelation process over time. An important feature
of this learning mechanism is that it rules out any strategic action by both parties to in￿ uence
the learning process. The evolution of the beliefs is entirely governed by the exogenous process
de￿ned in (3) and (4)6. As the ￿rm receives high output realizations, its anticipation that the
match is indeed of good quality increases. The opposite is true for a ￿rm that keeps receiving
low output realizations. Furthermore, the higher the initial prior about the match quality, the
higher the next period￿ s state variable.
Finally for simplicity, I refer to the unconditional probability of observing a high output
(low output) at each period as ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) in the rest of the paper. They are simply de￿ned as
linear functions of ￿: ￿(￿) = ￿￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿b) , (1 ￿ ￿(￿)) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b.
The presence of match speci￿c productivity implies that all matches are indexed by their
quality (￿) at any point in time. This requires a way of describing the heterogeneity at any
point in time. A mapping that gives the measure of the employment at any subset of the
5The fact that these two mappings are increasing in ￿ could be established by the positive sign of the ￿rst
derivatives. Also, comparing ￿
h;￿
l and ￿; one can easily establish that ￿
h(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
l(￿) is true. Concavity of
￿
h(￿) and convexity of ￿
l(￿) follow from these arguments and the fact that both ￿
hand ￿
l maps [0;1] to itself.
6This exogenous process dictated by learning for the evolution of match speci￿c output can be thought of as
any exogenous persistent match speci￿c productivity shock where the state space and the transition probabilities
are de￿ned appropriately. For instance, a process for this match speci￿c component may take values ranging
from ￿(0)y
h + (1 ￿ ￿(0))y
l to ￿(1)y
h + (1 ￿ ￿(1))y
l and the transition probability from the current state ￿ to
the future state might be de￿ned as Pr(￿
hj￿) = ￿(￿) and Pr(￿
lj￿) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿).
12match quality state space is a natural way of describing this heterogeneity. Let nt(￿) 2 [0;1]
be the total number of matches that are believed to be good quality with probability ￿. Since,
each match employs one worker, this also gives the total number of employed workers with
match quality index ￿. I also assume that agents are rational in their expectations. In other
words, ￿ fraction of all matches among nt(￿) are actually good quality. How this distribution
evolves over time depends both on the endogenous decisions made by agents and the equation
of motion for aggregate productivity. I assume that this is summarized by a function G such
that:
nt+1 = G(nt;zt;zt+1) (5)
In the discussion of the equilibrium, employment distribution and (5) plays a critical role.
4.2 Matching Technology and Wage Determination
The meeting process is facilitated by an aggregate matching function, which maps the number
of searchers on both sides of the market into meetings. Since this paper focuses on the
importance of the match quality distribution on reallocation over business cycles, search e⁄ort
will be ignored. This is not an unusual assumption in labor market search models, where search
input into the matching function is generally approximated by the number of unemployed. Due
to on-the-job search in this paper, search input is approximated by the measure of all searchers,
which equals the entire labor force7. The fact that both employed and unemployed workers meet
a vacancy this does not imply that employed workers ￿nd jobs at the same rate as unemployed
workers do. Idiosyncratic match quality generates endogenously di⁄erent matching rates for
all workers.
The matching technology is summarized by a constant returns to scale matching function,
M(vt;1), that takes the amount of job seekers, 1, and vacancies, vt as its arguments8. This
implies that the rate at which workers meet a job opportunity is f(vt) = M(vt;1)=1. Similarly,
a vacancy will meet a worker at the rate h(vt) = M(vt;1)=vt. The meeting rate is not equal
7Alternatively, one can assume negligible costs for exerting search e⁄ort for all workers to ensure that both
unemployed and employed workers search for a job.
8Since not all meetings result in a match, the term "matching" is used for meeting, in the context of this
paper.
13to matching rate in this model, because not all meetings end as successful matches. There are
two possible types of meetings in this framework; meetings between an unemployed worker and
a vacancy, and meetings between an employed worker and a vacancy. Meetings between an
unemployed worker and a vacant ￿rm turns into productive matches if their common beliefs
about the match quality are above a certain threshold, which is to be determined endogenously
in the equilibrium. When an already employed worker meets a vacancy, she has to decide
whether to stay in her current match. This decision depends not only on the possible quality
of the prospective match (if formed), but also on the quality of her existing match. Agents￿
initial signal about the quality of the potential match is also drawn from ￿. As a result, if the
worker quits and changes her job, the ￿rm becomes idle and can choose to post a vacancy next
period.
For simplicity, I assume that there is no recall of past job o⁄ers and no wage bidding by ￿rms
to attract a worker. Incorporating a strategic interaction between a worker￿ s current employer
and a potential employer might change the results presented here at the expense of compli-
cating the wage determination mechanism. This simplifying assumption is not uncommon
in the literature (Nagypal, 2005). Furthermore, this paper aims to provide a mechanism for
ampli￿cation through the e⁄ects of labor market search on the entire employment distribution
but not on wage determination.
The ￿rm pays a wage that is determined by a sharing rule over the match surplus which
is common in the literature9. The sharing rule is such that workers keep ￿ 2 (0;1) fraction
of the match surplus whereas ￿rms get (1 ￿ ￿) of it. Wages are renegotiated each period by
splitting the surplus with the same rule. This does not preclude persistence in wages because
inherent match quality, ￿, and aggregate productivity, z, are both persistent. Under these
assumptions about wage determination, it is clear that a worker already employed in a match
with ￿ probability of being a good match is willing to switch to a new employer if she faces a
higher initial signal. Thus, she experiences a job-to-job transition if new signal, ￿0, is greater
than the current match quality, i.e. ￿0 > ￿ 10. If the current employment distribution is nt,
9This is equivalent to Nash Bargaining when there is no on-the-job search. Shimer (2003) analyses strategic
bargaining in a model of on the job search.
10I assume, throughout the rest of the analysis, that she retains the match when indi⁄erent. It is intuitive to
suggest that not all workers will be willing to change jobs if it is costly enough. This will only require a certain
premium over the current match and reduce some job-to-job transitions. However, for empirically plausible
14then the probability that an employed worker, conditional on meeting, is willing to switch jobs
is a function of this distribution:
Z
nt(￿)(1 ￿ ￿(￿))d￿ (6)
This is the essential feature of the model that introduces the employment distribution into
the state space.
Finally, the alternative to a match for a ￿rm is posting a vacancy , which costs c > 0
units of consumption per period and generates a possibility of a new match in the next period.
Firms have incentive to post vacancy as long as the value of posting one is positive. This
is ensured by the free entry of ￿rms and implies that equilibrium value of vacancy is driven
to zero. For workers, the outside option is to be unemployed and to consume b > 0, which
could be interpreted as unemployment bene￿ts or value of leisure. This implies that ongoing
matches are destroyed endogenously when the match surplus becomes negative. Because of
the particular sharing rule I use, such a decision does not create any disagreements, i.e. both
parties agree to end the match jointly. In the equilibrium, this implies a reservation prior, ￿ ￿:
below which the match ceases to be productive and dissolves. On the other hand, a worker
may unilaterally end a match, if she meets another vacancy and gets a better initial match
quality signal. As explained in the previous paragraph, ￿rms should take the possibility of
such a decision into account when they are in a match. Hence, on-the-job search introduces
possible match destruction, even though the surplus of the match is strictly positive. Matches
are also subject to an exogenous shock in each period that renders the match unproductive.
This probability is denoted by ￿11.
4.3 Timing of Events
It would be instructive to describe the timing of events within a period to understand agents￿
information set at each point in time. Events with a time period follows the sequence below,
which is also depicted in a chart at the end of the paper:
values for such costs it does not eliminate job-to-job transitions, hence the mechanism underlined in this paper.
11This exogenous probability ensures that in the nonstochastic steady state of this economy we have a non-
degenerate employment distribution over match quality space.
15￿ Matches that were productive in the last period start the period t with the information,
￿t;zt and nt. Unemployed workers and vacant ￿rms start the period with zt and nt.
￿ Workers and ￿rms within a match decide whether to stay or exit the match. Because of
the surplus sharing rule, there is no disagreement between two parties.
￿If the decision is to stay, production occurs, yt is realized. Workers consume wages,
￿rm consumes net output. Match quality is updated to ￿t+1:
￿If the decision is to exit, worker becomes an unemployed searcher and consumes b.
Firm becomes idle.
￿ After production, match quality distribution changes to n+
t , which is di⁄erent from nt
due to learning and endogenous separations.
￿ Firms decide to post vacancy at the cost of c until the value of a vacant position is driven
to zero. This pins down the total number of vacancies, vt.
￿ Meetings occur according to M(vt;1), and initial signals are drawn from ￿.
￿Employed worker who meets a vacancy quits and changes her job if the new signal
indicates a higher quality match. This decision is unilateral.
￿Unemployed worker who meets a vacancy decides whether to form a match or stay
unemployed.
￿ New matches are formed, which will be productive in t+1. Existing matches are subject
to exogenous destruction with probability ￿.
￿ Match quality distribution is updated to nt+1.
4.4 Bellman Equations
In order to de￿ne the equilibrium of this economy, I start with the Bellman equations that
determine values of being in di⁄erent labor market states. State variables for agents form a list
f￿;z;ng, where n is the aggregate employment distribution and time subscripts are dropped
for convenience. Aggregate state variables z and n are not correlated with the law of motion
16for the individual state variable ￿; since the learning process is independent of the aggregate
state12. Equation of motion for ￿ is given by posteriors de￿ned in (4), whereas that of z is
governed by the Markov process. The part of the law of motion that concerns n(￿) is denoted
by G such that n0 = G(n;z;z0), where the variables with "0" denote one period ahead variables.
Knowing the aggregate state allows agents to predict future meeting rates.
Let Vu(z;n) be the value of being unemployed for a worker when aggregate productivity is
z and the employment distribution is n.




Ve(￿0;z0;n0)d￿(￿0) + (1 ￿ f(v))Vu(z0;n0)
￿
(7)
An unemployed worker consumes b in this period and expects to come up with a possible
match with probability f(v), in which case, she gets the value of having a match, denoted by
Ve(￿0;z0;n0). Alternatively, she will stay unemployed with probability 1 ￿ f(v). Expectation
operator takes ￿(z0jz) into account and n0 is governed by G(n;z;z0).
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(8)
The worker compares the returns on retaining the match and not accepting or dissolving it.
First ￿ve terms within the maximum operator de￿ne the discounted expected value of forming
12The matches that will survive in di⁄erent aggregate states will be a function of the aggregate state in
equilibrium. What I mean here is that conditional on survival of the match in the next period posterior is only
determined by the exogenous learning process.
17(or staying with) the match. Current return from the match equals wage payments, w(￿;z;n).
Expected value of staying in the match has three components. First, the worker might not meet
another vacancy with probability ￿(1￿￿)(1￿f(v)) and stay with her current employer. In this
case, depending on the current output realization, she will update her belief about the quality of
the match according to (4). Since a high output is realized with probability ￿(￿), the expected
future value of the match becomes Ve(￿h;z0;n0). Alternatively, a low output realization leads
to a lower posterior and a corresponding expected future value of being in a match, Ve(￿l;z0;n0).
The latter two terms state what happens when worker meets a new vacancy. She faces a new
vacancy with probability ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f(v)￿(￿) after recently producing high output. Depending
on the result of the new draw from the distribution ￿; either the current match survives or
the worker experiences a job-to-job transition. Current match survives, if the new draw falls
below ￿h and dissolves otherwise. Once again, note that this separation is initiated by the
worker. On the other hand, a new meeting might occur following a low output, which happens
with probability ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f(v)(1 ￿ ￿(￿)). Worker￿ s choice between her current match and the
new vacancy is determined similarly. Finally, the match might exogenously dissolve due to an
exogenous shock with probability ￿.
Firm￿ s problem could be de￿ned in terms of Bellman equations in a similar fashion. Let
Ju(z;n) and Je(￿;z;n) be values of having a vacant job and being in a match respectively.




Je(￿0;z0;n0)d￿(￿0) + (1 ￿ h(v)￿)Ju(z0;n0)
￿
(9)
Posting a vacancy costs c per period and ensures that the ￿rm will meet a worker in the
next period with probability h(v). Conditional on meeting with a worker, ￿rm ends up forming
a match with probability ￿, which is a function of the employment distribution and is de￿ned
in detail in the following section.
On the other hand, the position might stay vacant either because the contacted worker does
not accept the match (with probability h(v)(1￿￿)) or the position could not meet any worker
at all (with probability 1 ￿ h(v)).
18Je(￿;z;n) = max
8
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(10)
A ￿rm that starts the current period with a match that is of good quality with probability
￿; has to decide whether to go on with this arrangement and pay w(￿;z;n) to the worker or
destroy the match (or not start the match at all). In the latter case, payo⁄to the ￿rm is simply
the value of being a vacant job. Current return from the match to the ￿rm is the expected
net output which is de￿ned as z(￿(￿)yh + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))yl) ￿ w(￿;z;n). Once the ￿rm stays
with this match, worker￿ s possible meetings with new vacancies should be taken into account
to determine the discounted expected future value. For instance, the ￿rm￿ s employee might
contact a new vacancy with probability ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f(v). When there is no new meeting in the
next period, which happens with probability ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ f(v)), expected value of the current
match only depends on how beliefs and the aggregate state change. However, whenever the
￿rm￿ s employee contacts a new vacant position, the future of the match depends on worker￿ s
choice because of the absence of any wage bidding. For instance, a new vacancy is contacted
by the worker following a high output with probability ￿(1￿￿)f(v)￿(￿); and the match will be




(￿(￿h)). If the current period output turns
out to be low, these probabilities change accordingly. Finally, the match may end due to an
exogenous shock, leaving the ￿rm with a vacancy.
195 Equilibrium
There are four endogenous decisions to be made by the agents in this economy: Workers￿and
￿rms￿decision as to when to destroy an existing match, workers￿choice to unilaterally end the
match to make a job-to-job transition, ￿rms￿decision on how many vacancies to create and the
wage to be paid. Among them the second decision is trivial and has already been substituted
in the Bellman equations in the previous section. It simply implies that a worker will not
accept any new job match, if the prior about the match speci￿c quality in this new o⁄er falls
below her belief about her current match quality. Hence, in what follows, I focus on the other
three decisions.
Let ￿(￿;z;n) denote the optimal decision rule on match formation (and destruction) and v(z;n)
denote the number of vacancies posted in equilibrium as a function of the aggregate state. Then
the equilibrium of this economy can be easily de￿ned.
De￿nition 2 The equilibrium of this economy is a list w(￿;z;n); v(z;n); ￿(￿;z;n); Je(￿;z;n);
Ju(z;n); Ve(￿;z;n); Vu(z;n) and G(n;z;z0) such that;
1. Given w(￿;z;n); v(z;n), ￿(￿;z;n) and G(n;z;z0); value functions satisfy (7)-(10)
2. Given w(￿;z;n), v(z;n), G(n;z;z0) and value functions, ￿(￿;z;n) is optimal.
3. (Free entry of ￿rms) Given w(￿;z;n); ￿(￿;z;n); v(z;n)and G(n;z;z0), each ￿rm posts a
vacancy as long as Ju(z;n) > 0. Hence, aggregate v(z;n) makes the value of posting a
vacancy zero, i.e. Ju(z;n) = 0;8z;n.
4. (Surplus Sharing) Each period: Ve(￿;z;n)￿Vu(z;n) = ￿[Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) + Ve(￿;z;n) ￿ Vu(z;n)]
and Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) = (1 ￿ ￿)[Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) + Ve(￿;z;n) ￿ Vu(z;n)].
5. Decision rules w(￿;z;n);v(z;n), and ￿(￿;z;n) indeed generate G(n;z;z0) subject to
Bayesian updating and equation of motion for z.
The speci￿c surplus sharing rule used in this paper implies that both workers and ￿rms agree
to leave when the surplus of the match falls below zero. Surplus of the match is de￿ned as the
quantity, Je(￿;z;n)￿Ju(z;n)+Ve(￿;z;n)￿Vu(z;n). When the match surplus is negative, the
20share each party gets become negative simultaneously. Hence, in order to describe the decision
rule ￿(￿;z;n), it is essential to write down the surplus function. Subtracting outside options
from Je(￿;z;n) and Ve(￿;z;n); and adding them up leads to an expression de￿ning the value of
the surplus from a match with quality ￿, in aggregate state z and n. Details of the derivation
is presented in the appendix. Let this value be denoted by S(￿;z;n). The appendix shows
that this surplus function has the following recursive form.
S(￿;z;n) = max
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
z(￿(￿)yh + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))yl) ￿ b
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ f(v))Ez0jz
￿


















> > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > ;
(11)
subject to ￿(z0jz) and G(n;z;z0).
This equation is one of the key equations characterizing the equilibrium. For any v > 0,
this equation describes when an existing match should be destroyed bilaterally. Since the right
part of the expression within the outermost bracket is constant and the left is increasing in ￿,





1 if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(z;n)
0 if ￿ < ￿ ￿(z;n)
(12)
The reservation threshold, ￿ ￿(z;n), determines whether a match should survive. It also
summarizes the hiring decision. In other words, a meeting will turn into a match if the
reservation threshold is reached and an ongoing match is terminated if the match quality falls
below this threshold. In equilibrium, it turns out that ￿ ￿(z;n) is a decreasing function of z.
Intuitively, agents become less willing in recessions to undertake matches that are less probable
to be good quality. Since all matches are less productive the threshold for a match to survive
is higher in recessions. This particular form of the decision rule causes discrete changes in
employment distribution across di⁄erent aggregate productivity levels. For instance, when
21productivity falls, all prevailing matches that have current priors below the new (and higher)
threshold will be destroyed endogenously. Hence, some existing matches that are productive
in expansions cease to be so in recessions, causing countercyclical job destruction.
The second important equation determining the equilibrium of this economy comes from the
free entry condition and pins down the equilibrium number of vacancies posted. As it is shown
in the appendix, the value of vacancy can be written as a function of the surplus function. It
takes a simple form:
Ju(z;n) = ￿c + ￿Ez0jzJu(z0;n0) + ￿h(v)￿(1 ￿ ￿)Ez0jz
Z
S(￿0;z0;n0)d￿(￿0) (13)
However, free entry of ￿rms imply that Ju(z;n) = 0 for all z;n in equilibrium. Substituting






Equations (11) and (14) jointly determine the equilibrium values for v(z;n) and ￿ ￿(z;n).
These two equilibrium conditions are standard in models of labor market search with endogenous
job destruction (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). Given the law of motions G(n;z;z0) and
￿(z0jz) for the aggregate state, they characterize part of the equilibrium de￿nition.
The rest of the equilibrium requires describing the endogenous equation of motion for the
aggregate match quality distribution. Equilibrium de￿nition requires that the decision rules
determined by (11) and (14) should be consistent with the equation of motion for the match
quality distribution, G(n;z;z0). The presence of this distribution signi￿cantly complicates the
numerical solution. Thus, I leave the discussion of this last component of the equilibrium to
the following section, which describes the practical challenges of the computational problem
and the solution method employed.
5.1 Employment Flows
In order to shed more light on the mechanism advocated in this paper, it is essential to un-
derstand how match quality distribution evolves over time. Let nt￿1 be the match quality
distribution at the end of time period t￿1. I assume that agents, both workers and ￿rms, are
22rational in their expectations about match quality. In other words, among the matches that
are currently believed to be good with probability ￿; fraction of the good matches are indeed
￿.
From any distribution nt￿1, decision rules v(zt;nt), ￿(￿;zt;nt) and law of motion G(nt￿1;zt￿1;zt);
generate the employment distribution for time period t:
nt(￿) = ￿(￿;zt;nt)
8
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, 8￿ 2 [0;1]
(15)
where g(￿) denotes the pdf of the distribution function ￿(￿); and ￿1 and ￿2 are de￿ned as;
￿ =
￿1￿g
￿1￿g + (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿b)
and ￿ =
￿2(1 ￿ ￿g)
￿2(1 ￿ ￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿2)￿b
(16)
This recursive de￿nition for employment distribution tracks down employment reallocation
across di⁄erent quality matches over time. To better understand the notation, it is helpful
to think where workers should have been in the last period to end up in matches with a
particular match quality ￿. First of all, some fraction of workers with this match quality
constitutes new hires from the unemployed. This corresponds to the last term in brackets in
(15). Previously unemployed workers meet a vacancy with probability f (v(zt;nt)). Hence,
f (v(zt;nt))(1￿
R 1
0 nt￿1(￿0)d￿0) gives the total measure of unemployed who meet a vacancy this
period. Among them, only g(￿) of them draws the prior ￿; and are candidates for a new
match with ￿ quality in this period. However, the decision to form the match as a result of
this meeting depends on the rule, ￿(￿;zt;nt). This condition implies that overall number of




nt￿1(￿0)d￿0)[1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿(zt;nt))]: (17)
23Flows into nt(￿) might also come from already employed workers. This group of workers
have potentially di⁄erent histories. For instance, some of them end up in nt(￿) after a job-
to-job transition. On the other hand, a fraction of these already employed workers constitute
participants of matches that endogenously update their posteriors to ￿ after output realizations
in the last period. Let￿ s consider matches which might improve their posteriors to ￿, because
they have recently experienced a good output realization. This happens to matches with
￿1 probability of being a good match in period t ￿ 1. Hence, they were part of nt￿1(￿1).
Only (1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿1) of nt￿1(￿1) experience high output and do not su⁄er an exogenous match
destruction. Some of the workers in these matches might not meet any other vacancy at all,
which happens with the probability (1 ￿ f (v(zt;nt)). The rest of them, however, might not
be willing to change jobs even if they meet a new vacancy, which occurs with the probability
f (v(zt;nt))￿(￿1). This completes the description of the ￿rst term within brackets in (15).
The second term de￿nes the measure of previously employed workers from matches that has
experienced a low output in the last period and yet survived exogenous shocks.
The following two terms in (15) give the measure of workers who ended up in a match
with ￿ match quality after quitting their previous matches. If these workers have recently
experienced a high output in the last period, they could potentially come from the interval
[0;￿1]. Otherwise, they were part of the employment distribution over [0;￿2]. Note that,
employment distribution by the end of period t, should always take ￿(￿;zt;nt) into account.
This part creates the separation that is endogenous.
The results in this paper show that most of the reallocation is undertaken through job-to-job
transitions. A job-to-job transition necessarily implies a simultaneous separation and a new
hire. Thus, it involves reallocating workers across matches.
5.2 Computational Strategy
Match quality distribution is part of the state space in this model. Due to (6), ￿rms need
to predict this match quality distribution. It appears explicitly in ￿rms￿Bellman equations
through ￿ and implicitly in workers￿Bellman equations. The challenge posed by the presence
of aggregate distribution is not new in the literature. It is well known that numerical solutions
of economies with heterogenous agents where aggregate distribution is a state variable is fairly
24complicated. Fortunately, Krusell and Smith (1998) provides us with a possible computational
strategy to solve this type of problems. The novelty in their approach is to approximate
the function G(n;z;z0) with a ￿nite set of moments in such a way that it is consistent with
individual￿ s problem and is the best approximation within a particular class of functional forms.
Hence, individuals use this approximate function to predict future prices and their predictions
are approximately equal to the actual time series from the simulated model.
The same methodology may be applied to our problem. Krusell and Smith (1998)￿ s example
economy is a standard neoclassical growth model with uninsured idiosyncratic individual risk
of being unemployed. Hence, individuals in their economy need to predict aggregate capital
stock distribution in the next period to pin down the prices that they will face tomorrow. It
turns out that a log linear equation in average capital stock is a su¢ cient representation of
how the entire distribution evolves. In our example however, agents need to predict the future
match quality distribution to pin down the probability of a worker￿ s acceptance of a new job
o⁄er.
Recall that the beginning of period match quality distribution evolves from nt to n+
t be-
cause of the new information revealed through production and endogenous separations at the
beginning of the period. Then the probability that a worker who meets a vacancy accepts
￿rm￿ s job o⁄er is a function of the match quality distribution:
￿ = (1 ￿
Z
n+
t (￿)d￿)(1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿)) +
Z
n+
t (￿)(1 ￿ ￿(￿))d￿ (18)
The ￿rst term in (18) gives the probability of meeting an unemployed worker and forming a




unemployed workers and they receive an initial signal. If it is above the reservation threshold,
￿ ￿, it is worth to form the match. This comes from the equilibrium decision rule ￿(￿;z;n); which
takes the value 1 for ￿ > ￿ ￿ and 0 otherwise. The second term in (18) gives the probability of
meeting an employed worker and forming a match. Each worker who is in a match indexed by
belief ￿, will accept the ￿rm￿ s match o⁄er with probability 1 ￿ ￿(￿).
This is why, for practical purposes, it is su¢ cient to have a simple probability in the state
space instead of the match quality distribution. The computational algorithm I use to solve
25for the equilibrium of this economy involves an approximation of the law of motion for ￿. So,
even though the match quality distribution is changing over time, agents need to know how
a simple moment of this distribution changes over time. For any equation of motion de￿ned
by G(n;z;z0), there is an implied equation of motion for ￿13. Let the equation of motion
implied be H(￿;z;z0). Given this belief and the stochastic process for z, agents￿problem could
be solved using equilibrium conditions (11) and (14). Solution to these equilibrium conditions
lead to decision rules ￿(￿;z;￿) and v(z;￿), which are now de￿ned as a function of ￿ for practical
purposes. Then, these decision rules, an initial condition for employment distribution, equation
of motion for employment, (5), and the de￿nition for ￿ determine next period￿ s probability ￿0.
If this ￿0 is consistent with H(￿;z;z0), we arrive at the ￿xed point of the mapping from (￿;z;z0)
to ￿0. The next step involves determining whether H(￿;z;z0) is a ￿ good￿approximation for
the underlying equation of motion, G(n;z;z0). This ensures that agents lack of knowledge
about the evolution of the match quality distribution causes only negligible errors in optimal
decisions.
The precise algorithm for the computation of the equilibrium involves following steps:
1. Select N-point grid on ￿, 2-point grid on z and M-point grid on ￿.
2. Guess on a parameterized functional form for H(￿;z;z0) and on parameters of this func-
tion. Call this ^ H.
3. Given ^ H, guess a Nx2 vector, v(z;￿) and solve the decision rule ￿(￿;z;￿) by Iterating
over the surplus function de￿ned in recursive equation (11) until convergence. Obtain
the value of S(￿;z;￿):
4. Given the surplus function, S(￿;z;￿), check whether free entry condition in (13) is satis-
￿ed. If it is satis￿ed, v(z;￿) is equilibrium decision rule and continue to step 5. Otherwise,
if free entry condition implies that the value of vacancy is positive in state (z;￿), increase
v(z;￿), else decrease it and go to step 3 with the new guess on v(z;￿).
5. Use decision rules ￿(￿;z;￿) and v(z;￿) and an initial employment distribution to simu-
late the evolution of employment distribution. From this simulated series, estimate the
13This mapping may not be unique in principle.
26implied sequence of ￿. Use the estimated series of ￿, to update the parameters of the
functional form guess for H(￿;z;z0). If the initial guess on parameters are con￿rmed,
jump to step 6, otherwise go back to step 1 with a new set of parameter estimates.
6. Having had the parameters converged, check how much error the particular functional
form for ^ H creates for the agents. If the functional form enables them to predict proba-
bilities with negligible error, stop. Otherwise choose a new functional form and/or new
moments and start over.
Computational results show that a linear functional form for ￿0 is a good guess. The details
of this part of the computation is described in Section 7 below. Since computing H(￿;z;z0)
is an important contribution of this paper and is not standard in this literature, a separate
section within the main body of the paper is devoted to this computation.
6 Calibration
In order to understand the contribution of on-the-job search to ampli￿cation, I calibrate a
benchmark model, where there is no on-the-job search. This benchmark model is otherwise
identical (preferences, production and matching technology) to the model presented in the
preceding section. Hence, the benchmark model only has idiosyncratic match quality on top of
the standard model. This helps to identify the e⁄ect of on-the-job search. The time period is
one month and ￿ is calibrated to match 4% annual interest rate. This implies that ￿ = 0:9967.
First step is to calibrate a productivity process. This is achieved by estimating a two state
Markov-Chain approximation for the AR(1) process for the real output per worker in the non-
farm business sector. As Table 1 indicates, this productivity data has a standard deviation
of 0:02 and a ￿rst order autocorrelation of 0:89. Since the standard deviation of this process
will be a⁄ecting the volatility of other variables directly, matching the exact standard deviation
would be desired. Thus I ￿nd the following Markov process as the best approximation, which









5 , zh = 1:0259 and zl = 0:9748
27Several parameters are taken from other studies. The share of the surplus taken by worker,
￿, is chosen to be 0:36 (Shimer, 2005a). The mean of the truncated normal density ￿ is set to
0, i.e. ￿ = 0. This is from Pries and Rogerson (2005). I also normalize the value of the match
speci￿c output when it is low to 1, i.e. yl = 1.
The functional form for the constant returns to scale matching function is usually in Cobb-
Douglas form in standard search models. However, since I have on-the-job search with a unit
measure of search input, this particular form does not necessarily guarantee us a well de￿ned
meeting probability. In other words, f(v) and/or h(v) may not be well de￿ned for some v.
Thus, I choose a di⁄erent functional form for the matching function that has been used by





Equation (19) de￿nes a constant returns to scale matching function, which obeys the usual
regularity conditions. In addition, meeting probabilities within a period, f(v) and h(v) are by
de￿nition in [0;1].
Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
￿ 0.9967 4% interest ￿g 0.56 Match
￿ 0.36 Shimer (2005) ￿b 0.56 Restriction
yl 1 Normalization c 0.11 Match
zh 1.0259 U.S. Avg. b 3.32 Restriction
zl 0.9748 Output p/w yh 7 Match
￿ 0 PR (2005) ￿ 0.0041 DHS (1996)
￿ 0.153 PR (2005) zss 1 Normalization
In order to calibrate the rest of the parameters, I target three moments from the model;
steady state unemployment rate of 5:68%, steady state job ￿nding probability of 45% and steady
state probability of accepting a match conditional on meeting of 50%. The ￿rst two statistics
are from the data. The latter statistic equals 1￿￿(￿ ￿ss) and chosen to be in line with Pries and
Rogerson (2005). These targets imply a steady state monthly separation probability of 2:71%.
28This is slightly lower than the average separation probability in the U.S. data, which is 3:4%.
However, we cannot simultaneously match an average job ￿nding probability of 45% and an
average separation probability of 3:4%. The exogenous job destruction probability, ￿, is then
calibrated to match the fraction of shutdowns among all job destruction. Davis et al. (1996)
estimates that 11% of all job destruction is accounted for by shutdowns. Since all separations
in the benchmark model￿ s steady state are either exogenous (due to ￿) or due to learning about
the quality of the match, a slightly higher value for this fraction is targeted. Speci￿cally, it is
assumed that 15% of all separations are exogenous. This pins down ￿, which is set to 0:0041.
Since job ￿nding probability is f(vss)(1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ss) ) in the steady state equilibrium of this
benchmark economy, the target for 1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ss) implies that vss = 9. Given these targets,
learning process can be calibrated to match them. For instance, the standard deviation of
the distribution for prior signals, ￿, implies an equilibrium value for ￿ ￿ss if (1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ss) ) = 0:5.
The value of ￿ ￿ss does not have any intrinsic value for the purpose of this paper. Hence, I
target a value of 0:1 for this equilibrium value. This target and (1 ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ss) ) = 0:5, implies
that ￿ = 0:153. With the targets for ￿ ￿ss and vss and values for ￿,￿ and ￿, the model can
be easily simulated to generate a stationary match quality distribution. Only determinants
of this equilibrium distribution are learning parameters ￿g and ￿b. Recall that these two
parameters determine the pace of learning. There is no apriori reason to have a faster learning
depending on the inherent quality. Hence, it is assumed in the simulations that both good
matches and bad matches reveal the information at the same pace, i.e. ￿b = ￿g. Then, the
average unemployment rate requires ￿b = ￿g = 0:598. It turns out that the benchmark model
with these set of parameters actually imply a tenure distribution that is consistent with the
U.S. data. This is not a dimension that I target, but the stationary match quality distribution
determines how long each match is likely to survive. Taking this into account, the benchmark
model generates a tenure distribution such that 25:71% of the employed are with 1 year of
tenure, 21:42% of the employed are with 3-4 years of tenure and 23:49% of the employed are
with 5-9 years of tenure. The corresponding values from BLS￿ s Employment Tenure Summary
are 20:7%, 19% and 20:7% respectively14.
Calibrating a value for b is not straightforward. Recall that yl = 1. In this benchmark
14The data could be found in Table 3 of the Summary at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.t03.htm.
29model, ￿nding an interior solution for ￿ ￿, requires that the value of surplus is at least 0 for ￿ = 0
and strictly positive for ￿ = 1. In general, this implies that b should be somewhere between yh
and yl. Taking this restriction into account and the targets for ￿ ￿ss and vss, I pick the values
for b;yh and c. Implied values for these parameters are 3:32, 7 and 0:11 respectively. This
completes the calibration for the benchmark model.
7 Computing H(￿;z;z0)
The challenging task of computing the equilibrium of this economy is already outlined in Section
4.1. The most critical step of the algorithm is to determine a good functional form for the
equation of motion of ￿0. I posit a linear functional form guess, which depends on both the
current productivity and past productivity. Intuitively, since the model economy undergoes
signi￿cant discrete changes at the lower end of the distribution when aggregate productivity
changes, the equation of motion may very well depend on both states. To illustrate this,
consider two stationary distributions of match quality shown in Figure ??. The solid line
represents the stationary match quality distribution implied by the model outlined in Section
3, when aggregate productivity stays constant at zl forever: On the other hand, the dashed line
represents the stationary match quality distribution in expansions. Because the equilibrium
reservation threshold ￿ ￿ is a decreasing function of z, we have a substantial mass of workers
with lower match qualities in expansions. Although these thresholds change in the stochastic
equilibrium, this feature of the model survives. Thus, when the aggregate state changes,
there will be considerable job destruction (or creation) at the lower end of the distribution.
This justi￿es adding z0 (in addition to z) to the list of independent variables determining ￿0.
Ultimately I use the following functional form.
￿0 = ￿1 + ￿2￿, if z = zl and z0 = zl (20)
￿0 = ￿3 + ￿4￿, if z = zl and z0 = zl
￿0 = ￿5 + ￿6￿, if z = zl and z0 = zl
￿0 = ￿7 + ￿8￿, if z = zl and z0 = zl
30Once there is a functional form guess for H(￿;z;z0) and an initial set of parameter values
for ￿0s, computation of the equilibrium starts by discretization of the state space (￿;z;￿).
Aggregate productivity only takes two values, zh and zl. Match quality index is de￿ned on a
250-point grid over the unit interval. I use M = 250 grid points because the grid on ￿ should be
￿ne enough to capture the underlying individual heterogeneity. This heterogeneity determines
the exact value of the equilibrium condition ￿ ￿(z;n)15. Finally, ￿￿ s are assumed to take values
between 0:13 and 0:19 and are equally spaced on 15 grid points16. The upper and lower bounds
on ￿ are chosen such that at the simulation stage none of the realized (actual) values for ￿ fall
out of this range.
Next step is to solve the recursive equations de￿ned in (14) and (11) using the functional
guess for H(￿;z;z0). This step is fairly standard and leads to decision rules ￿(￿;z;￿) and
v(z;￿). Then, the model economy is simulated for 15000 periods starting from an initial
distribution. The simulation length should be long enough to create enough arti￿cial samples
for states (z;z0), where z 6= z017. Simulation of the model generates two separate time series
for ￿ one of which is predicted by H(￿;z;z0) and the other one is the actual. After discarding
the initial several hundred periods, actual realizations of ￿ are used to estimate the regressions
in (20) via ordinary least squares. The OLS estimates of ￿0s are used as new parameter guesses
until convergence. Once parameters converge, I need to evaluate the goodness of "￿t" for the
particular functional form for H(￿;z;z0).
It turns out that agents do infer ￿0 with considerable precision when only ￿,z and z0 are
explanatory variables. Regression results from the simulations of the model is a standard way
of measuring how good an approximation the equilibrium is (Krusell and Smith, 1998). The
15I have tried ￿ner grids, but they do not seem to lead to changes on the equilibrium values for ￿ ￿(z;n).
16Adding more grid points essentailly did not change the results at all. However, lowering the number of
grids for ￿ will reduce the predictive power of the functional forms for states (z;z
0), where z 6= z
0.
17Due to the persistence in z, these periods are very rare as opposed to periods when aggregate state does
not change at all.
31following four equations show the extent of the ￿t.
￿0 = 0:05044 + 0:69617￿, if z = zl and z0 = zl (21)
R2 = 0:9987; F = 5279389, p = 0
￿0 = 0:04774 + 0:83172￿, if z = zl and z0 = zh
R2 = 0:9974; F = 53143:60, p = 0
￿0 = 0:06635 + 0:51251￿, if z = zh and z0 = zl
R2 = 0:9841; F = 842:97, p = 0
￿0 = 0:06338 + 0:62260￿, if z = zh and z0 = zh
R2 = 0:9974; F = 2915907, p = 0
Parameter values reported in (21) are the values that have converged after several iterations
of the same functional form, and they are all signi￿cant at 5% level of signi￿cance. All three
measures of ￿tness reported underneath each regression equation indicate that the simple linear
functional form is a good way of describing how ￿ evolves18.
Other studies that modeled on-the-job search either assumed simplifying assumptions to
get rid of the endogenous e⁄ects of heterogeneity through meeting rates or simply restricted
the analysis to non-stochastic equilibrium. Examples of the ￿rst approach are Mortensen and
Nagypal (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2004). They abstract from match speci￿c productivity
changes, which shuts o⁄ the channel through which the employment distribution becomes a
state variable. As this paper argues, this channel is indeed very signi￿cant. Studies taking the
latter approach fails to show the full picture. They only focus on comparing di⁄erent steady
states or analyzing only the transitional dynamics (Barlevy (2002), Nagypal (2005), Shimer
(2003) ). However, this paper provides a solution for the stochastic equilibrium allowing us to
conduct a thorough business cycle analysis. These results are discussed in the next section.
18Another measure of "goodness of ￿t" can be the discrepancy between the ￿
0s implied by H(￿;z;z
0) and
actual ones. It turns out that the maximum discrepancy in a period was 0.00087. Furthermore, this di⁄erence
was always less than 0.0007 in all but 9 periods (out of 15000).
328 Results
To understand the role of on-the-job search in generating labor market ampli￿cation, both
the benchmark model and the model with on-the-job search are simulated. Table 4. presents
the results from simulations of the model with on-the-job search. As it is evident from the
reported standard deviations, the presence of on-the-job search creates signi￿cant variations
in our key labor market variables. Although the underlying aggregate productivity process
is assumed to be the same, a comparison of Table 4 and either Table 2 or 3 shows that the
model ampli￿es the e⁄ects of productivity shocks to a large extent. In standard search models,
unemployment, vacancies and market tightness are almost as variable as the exogenous forcing
process. However, same process generates quite encouraging results in the model with on-the-
job search. For instance, the standard deviation of unemployment and the Beveridge curve
relationship are easily matched (See Table 1). It also implies signi￿cantly large variations in
vacancies and market tightness, even though, they are a little far o⁄ from the data.
Table 4: On-the-Job Search
u v v/u u-e e-u e-e z
Std 0:19 0:13 0:31 0:14 0:29 0:14 0:02
Auto 0:88 0:73 0:84 0:80 0:67 0:81 0:81
Cross Correlations
u ￿0:89 ￿0:98 ￿0:94 0:86 ￿0:96 ￿0:97
v 0:96 0:99 ￿0:97 0:98 0:98
v/u 0:99 ￿0:92 0:99 0:99
u-e ￿0:96 0:99 0:99
e-u ￿0:95 ￿0:95
e-e 0:99
One might argue that, a direct comparison between Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 is not
reasonable. This is a legitimate concern, because the implied improvements in performance
might be due to one (or more) of the several extensions inherent in the model presented in
Section 4. In order to distinguish the e⁄ect of on-the-job search, I compare the results from
33simulations of the benchmark model, which is exactly identical except the on-the-job search
aspect.
Table 5: Benchmark Model (No OJS)
u v v/u u-e e-u z
Std 0:13 0:05 0:08 0:07 0:16 0:02
Auto 0:76 0:67 0:81 0:81 0:36 0:89
Cross Correlations
u 0:96 ￿0:98 ￿0:98 0:76 ￿0:98
v -0:90 0:90 0:78 ￿0:90
v/u 1 ￿0:71 0:99
u-e ￿0:71 0:99
e-u ￿0:70
Simulation results for the benchmark model are presented in Table 519. There are at least
two important di⁄erences between the benchmark model and the model with on-the-job search.
First of all, the standard deviations of the cyclical variations show signi￿cant decline, especially
for vacancies and vacancy-unemployment ratio. This proves that the relevant mechanism for
the ampli￿cation is on-the-job search. Another fact that stands out in Table 5 is related
to the Beveridge curve. The correlation between unemployment and vacancies implied by
the benchmark model is 0:96. This counterfactually positive relationship is a result of the
countercyclical vacancies in the benchmark model.
Without on-the-job search, equilibrium of this economy will only be a function of the level of
aggregate productivity. This follows from the constant returns to scale matching function and
the fact that the search input is proxied only by unemployment. Since all unemployed workers
are ex-ante identical and there are no meetings between vacancies and employed workers, the
probability of forming a match for a ￿rm only depends on the v=u ratio. For two di⁄erent
unemployment levels, as long as the aggregate state stays the same, free entry of the ￿rms
will ensure the same equilibrium level of v=u through variations in v20. Then v=u becomes
19The di⁄erence between Table 5 and Table 3 is only because of the di⁄erent functional forms used for matching
function. The model that generates the simulations in Table 3 assumes a standard Cobb-Douglas form.
20This is a fairly standard observation made about the labor market search and matching models.
34a su¢ cient statistic that determines vacant ￿rms￿problem. Hence, ￿ uctuations in aggregate
productivity is almost perfectly correlated with variations in v=u. In this case, market tightness,
v=u, is an increasing function of z.
In order to understand the counterfactually positive correlation, consider staying in the
same aggregate state for a few periods. Since z is constant over periods, there will be no
discrete changes in the pro￿tability of an ongoing match. In other words, separations do not
￿ uctuate a lot due to changes in ￿ ￿(z). Thus, with the same level of v=u, unemployment
will start shrinking over this episode. But, a constant v=u implies that v should also decline
over the same episode. Thus, there will be a positive correlation between unemployment and
vacancies over this particular episode. This seems to be a common feature of the standard
model too. So, why do I get positive correlation here instead of the negative correlation implied
by the standard model (with only exogenous separations ) ? The answer is intimately related
to the behavior of separations. The absence of endogenous separations forces the economy to
adjust to new aggregate shocks via changing the hiring behavior. If this is the only channel,
then changes in unemployment is induced only through the job ￿nding probability, f(v=u).
However, with endogenous separations due to low productivity, unemployment is also a⁄ected
by countercyclical separations. This dampens the magnitude of variations required in v in
response to negative productivity shock. Since such a negative shock induces a sharp decline
in u, the lower equilibrium value for v=u could be attained even with small changes (and in
Table 4 with large declines) in v21.
On the other hand, the model with on-the-job search implies a much more realistic picture
in this regard. In contrast to the benchmark model, the relevant equilibrium object is not v=u
but only v. Hence, aggregate productivity ￿ uctuations are accommodated through changes
in the number of vacancies posted. But as argued in the rest of the discussion here, ￿rms￿
incentive to create vacancies respond to the behavior of expected job-to-job transitions. This
is the channel which reverse the counterfactual implications of the benchmark model.
How does job-to-job transition create ampli￿cation and help to reconcile endogenous sepa-
rations with the Beveridge curve? The answer to this question lies at the heart of the model.
21Shimer (2005a) considers separation shocks as a possible driving force for unemployment ￿ uctuations and
discusses the point made here further.
35First, it is important to understand how the match quality distribution evolves in response to
aggregate productivity shocks. In order to illustrate this, it might be useful to analyze what
match quality distributions would look like in steady states with di⁄erent productivity levels.
These two di⁄erent match quality distributions are shown in Figure (??). It is clear from
the ￿gure that, in the high productivity steady state there are some employed workers in low
quality matches, which would have been unpro￿table otherwise. It also happens to be the case
that, since employment is higher in high productivity steady state, there are uniformly more
workers employed in each match quality level. Because, workers are better of by switching
to new jobs with higher quality, the odds of quitting and changing a job would be higher in
the high aggregate productivity state. This is crucial for the ￿rms that are considering to
post vacancies. Remember that one critical object in the model was the value for ￿, which
summarized this probability. Two distributions pictured in Figure (??) clearly show why one
should expect more workers to be willing to accept job o⁄ers from vacancies. Hence, vacant
￿rms might expect to meet with workers that are more willing to change jobs and accept their
o⁄ers in expansions.
In the standard search model, when ￿rms intend to create vacancies due to high aggregate
productivity, unemployment pool starts to shrink. Since new matches are formed only between
vacancies and unemployed workers, as the high productivity prevails, ￿rms loose incentive to
create any more vacancies due to smaller pool of potential matches. Here, however, high
productivity state serves as a good opportunity for workers to reallocate themselves for better
quality matches. This improved reallocation across matches also gives further incentive to
￿rms to create vacancies when aggregate productivity is high. Thus, the model implies a
signi￿cantly procyclical labor market reallocation through procyclical job-to-job transitions.
This model￿ s implications for labor market ￿ ows are also instructive in this regard. First of
all, by having the possibility of job-to-job transitions, the model has richer implications than the
standard model. As Table 4 indicates, e-e ￿ ows are signi￿cantly procyclical and as variable as
u-e ￿ ows. On the other hand, the ￿ ows from employment to unemployment is countercyclical
as expected but has very large variation. The cyclicality of job-to-job transitions is in line
with quits (Nagypal 2004a). However, we need to be cautious when interpreting u-e ￿ ows.
In theory, these separations happen with mutual consent, so it is neither layo⁄ nor quit. If
36both e-u and e-e ￿ ows are considered to be "separations", the enormous volatility in e-u does
not carry over to all separations. This is due to the negative relationship between both ￿ ows
constituting "separation," i.e the procyclicality of e-e dampens the e⁄ect of e-u.
9 Conclusion
The Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search model has been recently criticized because of the
model￿ s quantitative implications for business cycles. In particular, researchers have pointed
out the discrepancy between the implied level of variation in unemployment, vacancies and
market tightness and the observed variation in these variables in the United States. This
paper extends the baseline labor market search model to include on-the-job search and match
speci￿c heterogeneity to generate the missing ampli￿cation. The mechanism works through
the e⁄ects of aggregate productivity shocks on the entire employment distribution.
There is incomplete information about the quality of the employee-￿rm match which pro-
vides persistence in employment relationships and the rationale for on-the-job search. Am-
pli￿cation arises because productivity changes not only a⁄ect ￿rms￿probability of contacting
unemployed workers but also of contacting already employed workers. Since the measure of
workers in low quality matches is greater, this probability is higher during expansions. This
introduces strongly procyclical labor market reallocation through procyclical job-to-job transi-
tions, which has been a generally ignored feature in the literature. Hence, the model provides
a possible channel which does not require changing the wage determination process or the in-
formation structure to a large extent to create more variation. In particular, simulations with
a plausible forcing process show that the standard deviations for unemployment, vacancies and
vacancy-unemployment ratio (market tightness) match the U.S. data. The model also recon-
ciles the presence of endogenous separation with the negative correlation of unemployment and
vacancies over business cycle frequencies.
This paper also has a methodological contribution. On-the-job search with match hetero-
geneity requires to take the entire employment distribution into account as part of the state
space. It is well known in the literature that this complicates the numerical solution of the
equilibrium. I adapt the algorithm used by Krusell and Smith (1998) to the problem described
37in this paper. The computational exercise suggests that approximating the worker￿ s acceptance
probability of a ￿rm￿ s job o⁄er su¢ ces to characterize the equilibrium. Other studies that have
modeled on-the-job search either assumed simplifying assumptions to get rid of the endogenous
e⁄ects of heterogeneity or simply restricted the analysis to non-stochastic equilibrium.
Several possible variations of the model has been ignored in this paper. One key feature
that should be considered is the e⁄ect of strategic bargaining at the wage determination stage.
Incorporating such an additional feature might be a natural extension of the model to get wage
rigidity and therefore might provide a comparison to the mechanism advocated here. I have
also focused on the mechanism itself without much discussion on the implied magnitudes of
the ￿ ows. This is mostly the case, because the underlying calibration of the model does not
target job-to-job ￿ ow statistics from recent studies. These possible extensions are left for future
research.
38. Appendix
A Standard Mortensen-Pissarides Model
In order to facilitate comparison the notation for describing the standard Mortensen-Pissarides
model will be similar to the notation used in the model presented in section 4, whenever possible.
There is a continuum of risk neutral workers and employers who discount the future at the
rate ￿ 2 (0;1). The measure of workers is normalized to 1 and they are either unemployed
looking for a job or employed and producing zt > 0 each period. All matches are identical.
Match output, zt; is stochastic and governed by a Markov process, ￿(zt+1jzt): There is no on-
the-job search. Hence, only unemployed workers are searching for a job. Active ￿rms could be
either producing by employing a worker, or waiting for a possible match after posting a vacancy.
There is free entry of ￿rms which guarantees that as long as the value of posting a vacancy is
positive, there will be active ￿rms posting vacancies. Posting a vacacny costs c > 0 per period
and enables vacant ￿rms to meet an unemployed worker through a matching function, M(vt;ut),
where vt is the aggregate number of vacancies and ut is the aggregate number of unemployed
workers. M(v;u) is constant returns to scale, which implies the following probabilities of
￿nding a job (for unemployed workers) and ￿lling a vacancy (for vacant positions).





Here ￿t = vt=ut is usually referred to as market tightness. When unemployed, workers
consume b > 0. Continuing matches are subject to exogenous destruction with probability
￿ each period: Wage, w(zt), is determined each period via Nash bargaining between worker
and ￿rm taking the threat points as value of unemployment and value of being a vacant job
respectively. Let the value of being unemployed be Vu(zt) and the value of a vacancy be Ju(zt).
Similarly, the value of being employed for a worker and the value of being in a match for a ￿rm
are denoted by Ve(z) and Je(z) respectively. These value functions are summarized in four
Bellman equations:
Vu(z) = b + ￿Ez0jz
￿
f(￿(z))Ve(z0) + (1 ￿ f(￿(z)))Vu(z0)
￿
(22)
39Ve(z) = w(z) + ￿Ez0jz
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)Ve(z0) + ￿Vu(z0)
￿
(23)
Ju(z) = ￿c + ￿Ez0jz
￿
h(￿(z))Je(z0) + (1 ￿ h(￿(z)))Ju(z0)
￿
(24)
Je(z) = z ￿ w(z) + ￿Ez0jz
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)Je(z0) + ￿Ju(z0)
￿
(25)
where time subscripts are dropped for convenience.
Consequently, the equilibrium of this economy satis￿es the following conditions:
1. (Optimization) Given, ￿(z) and w(z); value functions Vu(z); Ve(z); Ju(z) and Je(z) satisfy
(22) - (25).
2. (Free entry) Given ￿(z) and w(z) a ￿rm is willing to post a vacany as long as Ju(z) > 0:
Therefore in equilibrium, due to free entry Ju(z) = 0.
3. (Nash Bargaining) Ve(z) ￿ Vu(z) = ￿[Ve(z) ￿ Vu(z) + Je(z) ￿ Ju(z)], where ￿ 2 [0;1] is
the worker￿ s bargaining strength.
4. (Equation of motion for unemployment) Given an initial unemployment u0 decisions
should be consistent with the evolution of unemployment.
u0 = (1 ￿ u)￿ + u(1 ￿ f(￿)) (26)
The simulations in Table 2 use the following calibration.
40Table A. Calibration for MP Model
Parameter Value
￿ 0.9967 4% interest
￿ 0.36 Shimer (2005)
￿ 0.36 Shimer (2005)
yl 1 Normalization
zh 1.0259 U.S. Avg.
zl 0.9748 Output p/w
zss 1 Normalization
￿ 0.0339 Shimer (2005)
b 0.4 Shimer (2005)
c 0.24 Match uss = 0:0568
M 0.35 Match f(￿ss) = 0:45
B Surplus Function and Equilibrium Value of Vacancy
First, write down the values of Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) and Ve(￿;z;n) ￿ Vu(z;n) by subtracting
(9) and (7) from (10) and (8) respectively.
41Ve(￿;z;n) ￿ Vu(z;n) =
max
8
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￿Vu(z;￿) + ￿￿Ez0jzVu(z0;￿0) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ f(v))Ez0jzVu(z0;￿0)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)f(v)￿(￿)Ez0jzVu(z0;￿0)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)f(v)(1 ￿ ￿(￿))Ez0jzVu(z0;￿0);0
9
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(27)
Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) =
max
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
z(￿(￿)yh + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))yl) ￿ w(￿;z;n)















































+￿￿Ez0jzJu(z0;n0) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ f(v))Ez0jzJu(z0;n0)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)f(v)￿(￿)Ez0jz￿(￿h)Ju(z0;n0)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)f(v)(1 ￿ ￿(￿))Ez0jz￿(￿l)Ju(z0;n0);0
9
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(28)
Imposing the free entry condition, Ju(z;n) = 0 8z;n, and some simpli￿cation, yield the
following two equations.
42Ve(￿;z;n) ￿ Vu(z;n) =
max
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
w(￿;z;n)













































> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(29)
Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) =
max
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
z(￿(￿)yh + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))yl) ￿ w(￿;z;n)
















































> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(30)
Let S(￿;z;n) = Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) + Ve(￿;z;n) ￿ Vu(z;n) denote the match surplus.
Adding (29) and (30) provides the following expression for the match surplus.
43S(￿;z;n) = max
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
z(￿(￿)yh + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))yl)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ f(v))Ez0jz
￿


























> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(31)
The surplus sharing rule implies that Ve(￿;z;n)￿Vu(z;n) = ￿S(￿;z;n) for all ￿;z;n. This



















Then the surplus function reduces to
S(￿;z;n) = max
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
z(￿(￿)yh + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))yl)
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ f(v))Ez0jz
￿
















> > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > ;
(32)
Now I need to use (7) to pin down the value of ￿Vu(z;n) + ￿Ez0jzVu(z0;n0) in terms of
surplus function. It is possible by substituting Vu(z;n) + ￿S(￿;z;n) for Ve(￿;z;n), using the
surplus sharing rule.






d￿(￿0) + (1 ￿ f(v))Vu(z0;n0)
￿
(33)
And further simpli￿cation of (33) yields the desired expression.
Vu(z;n) ￿ ￿Ez0jzVu(z0;n0) = b + ￿Ez0jzf(v)￿
Z
S(￿0;z0;n0)d￿(￿0) (34)
Substituting (34) in (32) reduces (32) to a recursive functional equation in S(￿;z;n).
S(￿;z;n) = max
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
z(￿(￿)yh + (1 ￿ ￿(￿))yl) ￿ b
+￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ f(v))Ez0jz
￿


















> > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > ;
(35)
On the other hand, one can write down the equilibrium value of vacancy as a function
of the surplus function. This follows from the de￿nition of (9) and surplus sharing rule,
Je(￿;z;n) ￿ Ju(z;n) = (1 ￿ ￿)S(￿;z;n) for all ￿;z;n. Using these two conditions I arrive at
the following condition expressed in the text as :
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